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Sentencing jurisprudence has been continuously evolving
since the establishment of the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines ("the Guidelines"). The Supreme Court has worked to lim-
it the influence of the Guidelines while lower courts have at-
tempted to apply them. One particular area in flux is appellate
review of sentencing. Under the now-advisory Guidelines,
courts of appeals are still expected to review sentences. But the
Supreme Court has curtailed appellate court authority by re-
peatedly emphasizing that lower courts have discretion in sen-
tencing, even when courts impose sentences outside the Guide-
lines. Continuing its efforts to clarify the scope of review, the
Court recently held in Greenlaw v United States' that an appel-
late court cannot increase a defendant's sentence when the de-
fendant has appealed and the government has neither ap-
pealed nor cross-appealed.2
Despite Greenlaw, appellate courts have continued to issue
orders resulting in increased sentences, even when they do not
directly impose the increases themselves. Mechanisms used to
implement such increases include reinstating previously im-
posed sentences, remanding to the district court with the re-
quirement of providing an additional justification for the sen-
tence imposed, and remanding for recalculation of the
Guidelines range-all without a government appeal. While these
actions do not violate the express holding of Greenlaw, they can
lead to the same troubling result that Greenlaw aims to avoid:
the imposition of unanticipated sentence increases on a defend-
ant's appeal.
t BA 2013, The George Washington University; JD Candidate 2016, The Universi-
ty of Chicago Law School.
1 554 US 237 (2008).
2 Id at 240.
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These cases call for an inquiry into whether Greenlaw pro-
hibits all forms of sentence increases in the absence of a gov-
ernment appeal, rather than only those increases that appellate
courts directly impose sua sponte. Further, language from
Greenlaw introduces uncertainty as to district courts' ability to
increase sentences under similar circumstances, such as when
resentencing follows a defendant's successful appeal.
These issues implicate various legal principles governing
limitations on review authority, including the cross-appeal rule
and the doctrines of waiver and forfeiture. These issues also
raise questions about the power of the Guidelines themselves.
Whether courts can impose sua sponte increases may even di-
rectly influence a defendant's decision to appeal. If an appeal
might result in an increased sentence, a defendant will be dis-
couraged from bringing appeals based on otherwise-valid errors
when there is the potential for exposing unaddressed error in
the defendant's favor. However, there is some question as to how
the creation of this disincentive should be balanced against the
judiciary's interest in accurately applying the Guidelines.
While Greenlaw's formal holding only prevents appellate
courts from ordering an increase sua sponte, this Comment ad-
vocates a functionalist interpretation of Greenlaw as necessary
to fully restrict sentencing authority in the way the Court has
implied. Further, this Comment argues that under a function-
alist interpretation, various appellate court actions violate
Greenlaw.
Part I of this Comment reviews the relevant background
law, including the Guidelines and related statutory authority.
Part II describes in detail the precedent established by the Su-
preme Court in Greenlaw as well as the doctrinal concerns
raised by the dissent in that case. Part II also presents examples
of appellate courts employing alternative mechanisms to in-
crease sentences and then discusses whether these mechanisms
run counter to Greenlaw. Part III discusses implications of these
cases, both for future appellate review of sentencing and for dis-
trict court discretion in resentencing. Finally, Part III proposes a
more concerted application of the mandate rule as a solution.
I. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND APPELLATE REVIEW
AUTHORITY
Appellate review of sentencing determinations is governed
by a combination of statutory provisions and common-law
1706 [82:1705
Truth or Unintended Consequences
principles. The Guidelines serve as the "statutory" foundation
for initial sentencing and appellate review. The general scope of
appellate authority is codified in 28 USC § 2106, and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) 52(b) extends this author-
ity in the context of criminal cases. However, the crux of the
sentencing-review issue is the interaction between Greenlaw
and legal principles that, while not codified, pervade every area
of the law. These include the cross-appeal rule, the doctrines of
waiver and forfeiture, and the mandate rule. This Part first dis-
cusses the statutory authorities for appellate review and then
reviews the doctrines that are crucial to understanding why a
formalist interpretation of Greenlaw is the wrong approach.
A. Sentencing in the District Court
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act, 3
which established a commission to develop a standardized sen-
tencing system to reduce unwarranted disparities in sentencing
decisions. 4 The United States Sentencing Commission developed
the Guidelines, which went into effect in 1987 and "provided de-
tailed guidance for federal judges in the exercise of their sen-
tencing authority."5 Courts were directed to use preestablished
characteristics to determine a "criminal history category" as well
as an "offense level" for each defendant.6 The Guidelines assign
defendants to one of six criminal history categories on the basis
of their past conduct.7 Base offense level is determined by the
type of offense.8 The Guidelines then provide a number of "spe-
cific offense characteristics," which can be used to increase the
offense level.9 For example, monetary offenses often require cer-
tain increases based on the amount involved.1° The use of a gun
3 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987 (1984), codified as amended at 18 USC § 3551 et
seq and 28 USC § 991 et seq.
4 28 USC § 991(b)(1)(B). See also William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the
Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing Commission's Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Re-
form in the Midst of Inter-branch Power Struggles, 26 J L & Polit 305, 311-14 (2011)
(discussing the "noble purposes" of the Sentencing Reform Act, including reducing sen-
tencing disparities).
5 Sessions, 26 J L & Polit at 315 (cited in note 4).
6 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § iBi.1(a) (2014)
("USSG").
7 USSG §§ 4Al.1, 5A.
8 USSG § 2A1.
9 USSG ch 2, Introductory Commentary.
10 See USSG § 2B1.1(b) (providing for an increase in offense level based on the
amount of the loss resulting from larceny, embezzlement, or other forms of theft).
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in the commission of the crime can also support an increase.11
Certain general factors can be applied to justify an adjustment
in offense level, such as whether the offender was a minimal
participant.12 A prescribed sentencing range can be found by lo-
cating the intersection of the criminal history category and the
adjusted offense level on a matrix provided in the Guidelines.13
The Guidelines initially provided mandatory sentence rang-
es, and district courts could depart from these ranges only under
circumstances expressly laid out in the Guidelines or the Sen-
tencing Act of 1987.14 Since this system was enacted, the Su-
preme Court has taken numerous steps to reduce its influence-
most significantly by holding in United States v Booker15 that
mandatory application of the Guidelines is unconstitutional.16
However, courts are still required to consider the Guidelines
along with other sentencing goals, and as such, the Guidelines
"remain extremely influential."17
The Sentencing Reform Act contains express provisions gov-
erning appellate review of sentencing decisions for appeals by
either the defendant or the government. 18 Section 3742(f) lays
out the relevant procedures for appellate review and outlines
different steps based on the appellate court's findings. For ex-
ample, if the sentence was "imposed in violation of law" or based
on "an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines," the
appellate court must remand with appropriate instructions.19 If
the appellate court finds that the district court failed to pro-
vide adequate reasons for a departure or departed from the
Guidelines by considering an impermissible factor, the statute
11 See USSG § 2B3.1(b) (providing for an increase in offense level if a firearm was
discharged, used, brandished, or possessed during the commission of a robbery).
12 See USSG § 3B1.2.
13 See USSG § 5A.
14 Pub L No 100-182, 101 Stat 1266, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3551 et seq
and 28 USC § 991 et seq. See also Carissa Byrne Hessick and F. Andrew Hessick, Appel-
late Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 Ala L Rev 1, 5 (2008) (noting the limited circum-
stances in which a judge was permitted to depart from the Guidelines under the Sen-
tencing Act of 1987).
15 543 US 220 (2005).
16 Id at 245. The basis for the Court's holding was its conclusion that any facts used
to justify a sentence increase "must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury be-
yond a reasonable doubt." Id at 244.
17 Timothy J. Coley, Comment, Disputed Deductions: Delfino and the Fourth Cir-
cuit's Prudent Adoption of the Restrictive Approach to Tax Evasion Sentencing, 87 NC L
Rev 234, 253 (2008).
18 18 USC § 3742(a)-(b).
19 18 USC § 3742(f)(1).
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categorizes appellate court authority into two scenarios requir-
ing remand: (1) when the court finds that the sentence is too
high, and the defendant has appealed, 2° and (2) when the court
finds that the sentence is too low, and the government has ap-
pealed.21 Section 3742 distinguishes between two categories of
error. The first category includes errors based on a violation of
law or an incorrect application of the Guidelines; the second in-
cludes errors made when departing from the Guidelines.22 For
the latter type of error, but not for the former, the statute ap-
pears to require correlation between the direction of the error
and the identity of the appealing party.23 For example, if the ap-
pellate court finds that a sentence was based on a violation of
law or an incorrect Guidelines range, it is permitted to correct
the discovered errors to the detriment of the appealing party.24
However, if the appellate court finds that the sentence con-
tained errors in departure proceedings, the court is able to cor-
rect only those errors whose rectification would benefit the ap-
pealing party.25
While § 3742 clearly grants authority for appellate review of
sentences, it does not articulate a particular standard under
which this review should occur.26 In 2003, Congress amended the
statute to require de novo appellate review.27 However, after
finding mandatory application of the Guidelines unconstitution-
al in Booker, the Court severed this provision to make the
Guidelines advisory and thereby avoid the constitutional prob-
lem.2 8 The remaining provisions regarding appellate review were
left intact.
20 18 USC § 3742(f)(2)(A).
21 18 USC § 3742(f)(2)(B).
22 18 USC § 3742(a)(1)-(3), (b)(1)-(3).
23 If this interpretation is accurate, it might imply that appellate courts are permit-
ted to correct sentences sua sponte based on the first type of error, regardless of whether
this correction favors a nonappealing party. However, this interpretation was explicitly
rejected in Greenlaw. See Part II.A.1.
24 See 18 USC § 3742(f)(1).
25 See 18 USC § 3742(f)(2).
26 See Booker, 543 US at 260-61.
27 See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 § 401(d)(2), Pub L No 108-21, 117 Stat 650, 670, codified at 18 USC
§ 3742(e).
28 Booker, 543 US at 259-60. The provision on appellate review was severed be-
cause it contained cross-references to § 3553(b)-the section of the statute that required
sentencing within the Guidelines range-which was the main source of the statute's con-
stitutional problem and was excised by the Court. See id.
2015] 1709
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After Booker, the Court inferred a new standard of appellate
review based on the Guidelines' now-advisory nature.29 This
standard requires that courts review sentences to determine
whether they are reasonable, which has led to confusion in the
standard's application.30 Sentences are analyzed for two types of
reasonableness: procedural and substantive.31 Procedural rea-
sonableness requires that the district court consider all of the
factors outlined in § 3553(a) and any nonfrivolous arguments
made by the defendant with respect to these factors. 32 The cir-
cuits have been inconsistent in their development of procedural
review, but they have generally held procedural reasonableness
to require accurate calculation of the Guidelines range as well as
clear articulation of the district court's reasons for imposing the
sentence in relation to the defendant's specific characteristics
and arguments. 33 Substantive-reasonableness review is even less
clearly defined but focuses on whether the final term of the sen-
tence seems appropriate in light of the committed offense. 34
The Supreme Court has done little to define the standards
governing procedural and substantive reasonableness.35 The
29 See id at 260-61 ("We infer appropriate review standards from related statutory
language, the structure of the statute, and the sound administration of justice.") (quota-
tion marks omitted).
30 See Hessick and Hessick, 60 Ala L Rev at 8, 11-13 (cited in note 14).
31 See Anna Elizabeth Papa, Note, A New Era of Federal Sentencing: The Guide-
lines Provide District Court Judges a Cloak, but Is Gall Their Dagger?, 43 Ga L Rev 263,
280 (2008).
32 See id at 280-81. These factors include the character of the offense, the character
of the defendant, the need for deterrence and promotion of respect for the law, the kinds
of sentences available, the recommended sentencing range, and the need to avoid unwar-
ranted disparities in sentencing similar defendants. See 18 USC § 3553(a).
33 See Papa, Note, 43 Ga L Rev at 281 (cited in note 31).
34 See id at 282. The Court's holding and analysis in Greenlaw may bear on or be
affected by the distinction between these two types of reasonableness review. For a dis-
cussion of the confusion created by the lack of clarity in the reasonableness-review
standard, see generally Craig D. Rust, Comment, When "Reasonableness" Is Not So Rea-
sonable: The Need to Restore Clarity to the Appellate Review of Federal Sentencing Deci-
sions after Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough, 26 Touro L Rev 75 (2010). Because procedural
reasonableness requires accurate calculation of the Guidelines, further analysis could
evaluate whether this type of reasonableness mandates appellate review and correction
of procedural errors regardless of who has appealed and whom the error favors. In con-
trast, following Greenlaw, substantive-reasonableness review seems to clearly fall in the
category of review that courts should not engage in absent a request by either party to do
so. While the Court's holding in Greenlaw did not distinguish between these types of re-
view, analysis of the Guidelines' purpose-even after their demotion to advisory status-
may suggest that a distinction should be made. However, that analysis is outside the
scope of this Comment.
35 See Rust, Comment, 26 Touro L Rev at 75-77 (cited in note 34).
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Court has expressly prohibited certain practices in some in-
stances, such as a practice requiring that departures from the
Guidelines be justified by exceptional circumstances.36 But for
the most part, appellate courts have been left to create their own
standards. 37 Some circuits have chosen to give substantial defer-
ence to lower courts as long as the procedural sentencing re-
quirements have been met, while other circuits engage in what
is practically a "re-weighing of the facts."38 In some cases, appel-
late courts employ disparate standards even while citing lan-
guage from the same Supreme Court precedent.39 The result is a
procedure of appellate review with vague boundaries, mostly ex-
ercised on a trial-and-error basis while awaiting a response from
the Court.4°
B. Appellate Review of Criminal Sentences
Appellate review is defined generally by 28 USC § 2106 and
subsequently limited by various common-law doctrines.41 Section
2106 is a general provision that confers jurisdiction on courts of
appeals and provides that an appellate court "may affirm, modi-
fy, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment ... lawfully
brought before it for review.42 Interpretation of § 2106 alone is
insufficient to determine whether an appellate court is author-
ized to be the first to address an issue.43
Courts generally operate under the limitation of party
presentation, in which the court relies on parties to raise the
36 See Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 47 (2007).
37 For a discussion of the variance in appellate court standards and the Supreme
Court's response, see Alison Siegler, Rebellion: The Courts of Appeals'Latest Anti-Booker
Backlash, 82 U Chi L Rev 201, 202-05 (2015).
38 Rust, Comment, 26 Touro L Rev at 90-91 (cited in note 34).
39 See id at 101.
40 See Hessick and Hessick, 60 Ala L Rev at 33 (cited in note 14) (describing how
the Court's failure to provide "clear legal guidance" in sentencing is responsible for "the
unsettled nature of appellate review of sentences"); Rust, Comment, 26 Touro L Rev at
89 (cited in note 34) ("How post-Booker appellate review should be implemented, and
even what its goals are, is unclear .... As a result, appellate courts currently bear the
burden of reading their own meaning into what makes a given criminal punishment
,reasonable."').
41 See Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality
and Propriety of Appellate Courts' Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 Notre Dame
L Rev 1521, 1558 (2012) (providing examples of limits on appellate court authority under
§ 2106).
42 28 USC § 2106.
43 See Steinman, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 1560 (cited in note 41).
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relevant issues for review.44 This principle "discourages judges
from raising new legal claims missed by the parties" 46 and is
grounded in a desire to maintain an adversarial system as op-
posed to an inquisitorial one. 46 Similarly, the cross-appeal rule
prohibits an appellate court from "alter[ing] a judgment to bene-
fit a nonappealing party."47 This rule is meant to encourage "the
orderly functioning of the judicial system" by providing parties
with notice of the issues to be litigated.48 Both of these principles
require that courts refrain from evaluating or ruling on errors
that the parties themselves have not raised.
Certain common-law principles also limit the issues that
can be addressed by appellate courts. Courts cannot revisit ar-
guments that parties may want to present but have otherwise
forfeited or waived. 49 An argument is forfeited if the party fails
to make a timely assertion of a right before the appropriate
court. 0 An argument is waived only through the "intentional re-
linquishment or abandonment of a known right."51 While argu-
ments can be forfeited through inadvertence or inaction, waiver
requires an affirmative act.52
FRCrP 52(b) provides an exception to these limitations.53
This rule, known as the plain error rule, states that "[a] plain
error that affects substantial rights may be considered even
though it was not brought to the court's attention. ' 4 The Court
has indicated that this rule gives appellate courts the limited
ability to correct errors that were forfeited.55 However, it does
44 See Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L J 447, 449, 455-56 (2009).
45 Id at 456.
46 See id at 458 ("As Justice Scalia declared in a concurrence: 'The rule that points
not argued will not be considered is more than just a prudential rule of convenience; its
observance, at least in the vast majority of cases, distinguishes our adversary system of
justice from the inquisitorial one."').
47 Greenlaw, 554 US at 244.
48 El Paso Natural Gas Co v Neztsosie, 526 US 473, 481-82 (1999).
49 See Yakus v United States, 321 US 414, 444 (1944).
50 See United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 731 (1993).
51 Id at 733 (quotation marks omitted).
52 See Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitu-
tional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Mich L Rev 1214, 1214-15 (1977).
53 See Henderson v United States, 133 S Ct 1121, 1124 (2013) (indicating that "[a]
federal court of appeals normally will not correct a legal error made in criminal trial
court proceedings unless the defendant first brought the error to the trial court's atten-
tion ... [b]ut Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) creat[es] an exception to the
normal rule").
54 FRCrP 52(b).
55 See Olano, 507 US at 731.
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not permit appellate courts to revisit errors based on rights that
were waived. 56
A separate doctrine imposes a limitation on district courts
following remand: the mandate rule.57 This rule was recog-
nized by the Court in some of its earliest cases and has been
repeatedly reaffirmed.58 When remanding a case, appellate
courts can choose to restrict the issues for review.69 Lower courts
on remand are required to remain within the boundaries of the
issues that were addressed on appeal.60 Limited remands are
those that explicitly lay out issues to be resolved by the lower
court, whereas general remands give lower courts the "authority
to address all matters as long as [they] remain[ ] consistent with
the remand."' 1 Courts have typically interpreted general re-
mands to permit de novo review of sentencing.62 If the appellate
court does not make explicit limitations on remand, the lower
court is free to revisit any issues that the appellate court did not
decide.63 Whether an issue was "actually decided" is often sub-
ject to interpretation.64 Courts have been inconsistent when de-
ciding whether "opaque appellate dispositions" create binding
limitations on the lower courts. 65
As this Comment shows, these doctrines help demonstrate
the flaws created by a formalist approach to Greenlaw. The
56 See id at 733-34 ('Mere forfeiture, as opposed to waiver, does not extinguish an
error' under Rule 52(b).").
57 Commentators have suggested that § 2106 serves as statutory confirmation of
this rule. See, for example, Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H.
Cooper, 18B Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters § 4478.3
at 733 (West 2d ed 2002).
58 See, for example, Briggs v Pennsylvania Railroad Co, 334 US 304, 306 (1948)
("In its earliest days this Court consistently held that an inferior court has no power or
authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court. We do not see
how [the rule] can be questioned at this time.").
59 See United States v Obi, 542 F3d 148, 154 (6th Cir 2008) (explaining that § 2106
gives appellate courts "broad discretion" to define the scope of remand).
60 See Briggs, 334 US at 306.
61 Obi, 542 F3d at 154 (quotation marks omitted).
62 See, for example, id.
63 See id. See also Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 18B Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 4478.3 at 757 (cited in note 57) ('The reach of the mandate is generally limited to mat-
ters actually decided.").
64 See Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 18B Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.3 at
759-60 (cited in note 57) (comparing the difficulties of determining whether an issue was
actually decided for purposes of the mandate rule to the same determination for purposes
of issue preclusion).
65 Id at 755 & nn 45-46 (collecting cases).
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mandate rule, in combination with a functionalist interpretation
of the Court's holding, is presented as a possible solution.
II. LIMITING APPELLATE AUTHORITY IN SENTENCING REVIEW
In Greenlaw, the Court created yet another limitation on
appellate court authority when it held that courts of appeals
may not increase a sentence when the government has not ap-
pealed or cross-appealed. Part II.A begins with a thorough dis-
cussion of Greenlaw. A detailed discussion is necessary to un-
derstand the basis for the Court's rejection of sua sponte error
correction and the ways in which the arguments the Court relied
on in its decision might affect other appellate court responses.
Part II.B then reviews examples of subsequent cases in which
appellate courts have taken actions that, while not constituting
the sua sponte review prohibited by Greenlaw, might lead to
similar results. Finally, Part II.C discusses the potential impli-
cations of permitting these appellate court actions despite a
functionalist understanding of Greenlaw. Part II.D gives a brief
introduction to the consequences for district court authority, dis-
cussed in greater detail in Part III.
A. Greenlaw
In Greenlaw, the defendant was convicted in federal court
for his involvement in the sale of crack cocaine.66 His convictions
included two counts of carrying a firearm during a drug traffick-
ing crime in violation of 18 USC § 924(c).67 Under the statutory
scheme, a first conviction carries a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of five years and any subsequent conviction carries a man-
datory minimum of twenty-five years. 68 These sentences must
run consecutively.69 However, the district court did not count the
defendant's second charge as a "subsequent conviction" within
the meaning of the statute. 0 The court imposed a sentence of
262 months for 5 other offenses, 5 years for the initial § 924(c)
offense, and 10 years for the second offense, with a total sen-
tence imposed of 442 months.71
66 Greenlaw, 554 US at 240-41.
67 Id at 241.
68 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (C)(i).
69 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
70 Greenlaw, 554 US at 241 (quotation marks omitted).
71 Id at 241-42.
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Greenlaw appealed his sentence, arguing that he should
have received a total of only 15 years (or 180 months).72 The
Government did not appeal or cross-appeal, but it noted to the
appellate court that Greenlaw's sentence should actually have
been fifteen years higher based on the district court's failure to
count the second conviction as "subsequent" within the meaning
of § 924(c).73 Despite this potential argument, the Government
requested only that the appellate court affirm the original sen-
tence. 74 Citing the plain error rule from FRCrP 52(b), the Eighth
Circuit held that it had the discretion to raise and correct the er-
ror on its own.75 The court vacated Greenlaw's sentence and re-
manded the case to the district court with instructions to impose
the fifteen-year increase. 76 Though the Eighth Circuit seemingly
granted Greenlaw's own request for remand, the only possible
option at resentencing was an increase in his sentence. After be-
ing denied a rehearing, Greenlaw filed a petition for certiorari.77
1. The majority opinion.
The Supreme Court held that this sua sponte increase by
the appellate court exceeded the scope of its review authority,
finding that "absent a Government appeal or cross-appeal, the
sentence Greenlaw received should not have been increased."78
The majority indicated that the Eighth Circuit's reliance on
FRCrP 52(b) was misplaced and instead grounded its reasoning
in the cross-appeal rule7 The Court stated that nothing in the
text or history of FRCrP 52(b) suggested that it was intended to
override the cross-appeal rule.8o Further, the Court acknowl-
edged that it had never applied the plain error rule to the detri-
ment of an appealing party, noting that "[r]ather, in every case
in which correction of a plain error would result in modification
of a judgment to the advantage of a party who did not seek [the]
72 Id at 242.
73 Id.
74 Greenlaw, 554 US at 242 ("Having refrained from seeking correction of the
District Court's error by pursuing its own appeal, the Government simply urged that
Greenlaw's sentence should be affirmed.").
75 Id at 242-43.
76 Id at 243.
77 Id.
78 Greenlaw, 554 US at 240.
79 Id at 244, 247.
80 Id at 247, citing FRCrP 52, Advisory Committee Notes (1944).
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Court's review, [the Court has] invoked the cross-appeal rule to
bar the correction."81
On appeal, the Government conceded that the appellate
court erred in increasing Greenlaw's sentence.8 2 The Court invit-
ed a practitioner, Jay Jorgensen, to serve as amicus curiae in
support of the Eighth Circuit's position.83 Jorgensen presented a
number of textual arguments, all of which the Court rejected.84
First, he argued that the increase was authorized by the appel-
late court's authority under § 2106 to modify or set aside any
judgment brought before it.85 The Court found this argument
unpersuasive for the same reason it had rejected the Eighth Cir-
cuit's FRCrP 52(b) argument, concluding that § 2106 was also
not intended to override the cross-appeal rule.s6
Another argument was based on the plain language of 18
USC § 3742. Jorgensen argued that § 3742(f)(1) specifically
linked permissible adjustments by appellate courts to both the
party appealing and the direction of the error.8 7 This reading of
the statute dictates that excessively high sentences can be cor-
rected only in response to a defendant's appeal, and that exces-
sively low sentences can be corrected only in response to a gov-
ernment appeal. Section 3742(f)(2), which provides for the
correction of sentences imposed "in violation of the law," does
not have the same textual limitations of linking the identity of
the appealing party to the direction of the error.88 Jorgensen ar-
gued that this discrepancy gives courts the authority to correct
sentences that violate the law regardless of which party ap-
pealed and which party the correction would favor.89 The Court
found this argument unpersuasive, reasoning that when Con-
gress has previously wanted to create an exception to the cross-
appeal rule (and Jorgensen argued that § 3742(f)(2) creates such
an exception), it has done so explicitly. The Court concluded that
the statutory language in this case was not explicit.90
81 Greenlaw, 554 US at 247.
82 Id at 243.
83 Id.
84 Id at 248-52.
85 Greenlaw, 554 US at 248-49, citing Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Judgment Below, Greenlaw v United States, No 07-330, *40-43 (US filed
Mar 14, 2008) (available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 727813).
86 Greenlaw, 554 US at 249.
87 Id at 249-50. See also text accompanying notes 20-23.
88 Greenlaw, 554 US at 249-50.
89 Id at 249.
90 Id at 250-51.
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The Court made a point to acknowledge that this holding
does not affect sentencing-package cases-cases that "involve
multicount indictments and a successful attack by a defendant
on some but not all of the counts of conviction.91 Following a de-
fendant's appeal, an appellate court may vacate the entire ag-
gregate sentence; on remand, the district court can then increase
the sentences for the remaining charges.92 As long as the new
aggregate sentence is not longer than the original sentence, the
practice is acceptable because the defendant "will [ ] lose nothing
[on appeal], as he will serve no more time than the trial court
originally ordered."93
This conclusion emphasizes the validity of a functionalist
interpretation of Greenlaw. The Court found it necessary to indi-
cate that increases of individual sentences in sentencing-
package cases are permissible despite the cross-appeal rule only
because they do not result in a net loss for the defendant. This
exception implies that district courts should never increase sen-
tences following a defendant's appeal. Increases in sentencing-
package cases comply with this functional ban only because they
are offset by other reductions in the sentence. These offsets
would not be available in cases involving individual sentences
for individual counts, and therefore district courts should be
prohibited from making such increases.
2. The dissenting opinion.
Justice Samuel Alito's dissent and the majority's response to
the concerns he raised highlight the conflicts created by the ma-
jority opinion. Alito identified the disparity produced by the ma-
jority's holding and the Court's prior holding in North Carolina v
Pearce94 forty years earlier.96 In Pearce, the Court held that a
sentencing court confronted with new facts may impose a longer
sentence on remand after a defendant's successful appeal.96 This
holding suggests that district courts are not limited by the
same restrictions that the Greenlaw majority imposes on appel-
late courts and that they can therefore modify sentences to the
91 Id at 253.
92 See Greenlaw, 554 US at 253.
93 See id at 254.
94 395 US 711 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v Smith, 490 US
794 (1989).
95 Greenlaw, 554 US at 264-65 (Alito dissenting).
96 Pearce, 395 US at 723.
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detriment of a successful appellant. Alito pointed out that "new
circumstances" justifying a change by the sentencing court could
include the court's discovery, through appellate review, of its
own earlier error.97 This discovery would permit the district
court to disadvantage the appealing party by correcting the er-
ror, though the appellate court could not do the same. Alito
found this to be an inconsistent result. 98
The majority responded by indicating that the district court
would be confined by the doctrines of default and forfeiture. It
also stated that "[i]t would therefore be hard to imagine a case
in which a district court, after a court of appeals vacated a crim-
inal sentence, could properly increase the sentence based on an
error the appeals court left uncorrected because of the cross-
appeal rule."99
This apparent dictum of the Court, tucked away into a sim-
ple responsive footnote, encapsulates the spirit of Greenlaw, a
principle more expansive than its stated holding and supported
by other statements throughout the opinion. For example, the
Court noted that although it has ordered the correction of errors
not raised by defendants in the past, it has done so "only to ben-
efit a defendant who had himself petitioned the Court for review
on other grounds.100 The Court reasoned that "Greenlaw might
have made different strategic decisions had he known soon after
filing his notice of appeal that he risked a 15-year increase in an
already lengthy sentence."'' 1 This strategic impact is likely to
take place regardless of whether the threat of an increase occurs
at the appellate or resentencing stage, which supports the ar-
gument that the Court intended a broader prohibition that
would prevent these unanticipated increases at any stage.
Formally, the Greenlaw majority prohibited only an express
appellate command for a sentence increase in response to a de-
fendant's appeal. The language discussed above, however, indi-
cates that the Court contemplated a functional prohibition on
any appellate court actions that result in these unrequested in-
creases on the grounds that defendants should not suffer further
as a result of their own appeals. Cases following Greenlaw
demonstrate that Alito's fears were well founded: Appellate
97 Greenlaw, 554 US at 265 (Alito dissenting).
98 See id at 265 n 2 (Alito dissenting).
99 Id at 254 n 8.
100 Id at 247.
101 Greenlaw, 554 US at 253.
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courts are enabling district courts to correct errors that appel-
late courts left uncorrected to the detriment of appealing de-
fendants. Appellate courts are employing a formalist interpreta-
tion to effectuate unrequested increases, a violation of
Greenlaw's functional principle.
B. Appellate Action after Greenlaw
Following Greenlaw, it does not appear that any court has
attempted to impose its own harsher sentence sua sponte in re-
sponse to a defendant's appeal. However, some courts have tak-
en other actions that effectively lead to (or are likely to lead to)
the same result: an increase in sentence without a government
appeal. In doing so, some courts have addressed and distin-
guished Greenlaw, while others have not mentioned it.
The following sections discuss the various mechanisms ap-
pellate courts have employed that are in tension with a func-
tionalist interpretation of Greenlaw. This Section begins with a
discussion of the judicial action most similar to the one formally
prohibited by Greenlaw (and therefore the most egregious): re-
instating a previous sentence. This Section then addresses two
appellate actions that are less egregious but much more com-
mon: requesting additional explanation and requiring recalcula-
tion of the Guidelines. While the latter two responses appear on
the surface to be more legitimate responses to a defendant's ap-
peal, the fact that these types of appeals occur with greater fre-
quency suggests that they provide a greater opportunity to vio-
late Greenlaw's functional prohibition.
1. Reinstating a previous district court sentence.
One form of appellate action that has resulted in sentence
increases is the reinstatement of a sentence previously imposed
by the district court. In United States v Sevilla-Oyola,1o2 the de-
fendant was charged with various drug trafficking offenses10o
Sevilla-Oyola pleaded guilty with a negotiated offense level of
twenty-nine. 104 At his plea colloquy, the judge failed to inform
him that he faced the possibility of a life sentence, but later
imposed a sentence of 327 months on the first count and life
102 770 F3d 1 (1st Cir 2014).
103 Id at 4.
104 Id.
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imprisonment on the second. 1°5 Following that hearing, the dis-
trict court judge adjusted Sevilla-Oyola's sentence sua sponte to
960 months on the first count and 60 months on the second.106
After the defendant made a series of motions, the judge again
adjusted his sentence, this time to 345 months on the first count
and 60 months on the second.107 Sevilla-Oyola appealed all of his
sentences and challenged the judge's authority to make the ad-
justments, even though the final result was a sentence lower
than the one originally imposed.108
During the First Circuit's initial hearing of this case, the
court decided that the trial judge lacked the authority to make
the two adjustments to the sentence and accordingly remanded
with instructions to reinstate the original life sentence. 0 9 The
First Circuit acknowledged that the resulting increase from 405
months to life imprisonment "may seem harsh" but found it ac-
ceptable because Sevilla-Oyola "chose to proceed with this ap-
peal knowing he risked a higher sentence."110 Sevilla-Oyola then
requested rehearing on the grounds that his counsel had warned
only that he might receive a higher sentence on remand and not
that the appellate court itself might impose a higher sentence."'
Sevilla-Oyola also argued that the original appellate court deci-
sion conflicted with the Court's holding in Greenlaw.112
On rehearing, the First Circuit reiterated that the result of
the appeal-reinstatement of the life sentence-was fair because
at that time the court had believed that Sevilla-Oyola's counsel
had followed its instructions to ensure that Sevilla-Oyola was
aware of the risk.113 But because Sevilla-Oyola's counsel subse-
quently claimed that he had not fully complied with the court's
105 Id at 4, 6-7. The first count charged Sevilla-Oyola with conspiring to possess
narcotics with intent to distribute in violation of 21 USC §§ 841(a) and 860. The second
count charged Sevilla-Oyola with aiding and abetting coconspirators in the use of fire-
arms in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A). Id at 4.
106 Sevilla-Oyola, 770 F3d at 7.
107 Id at 9. Following his second sentence, Sevilla-Oyola moved for the recusal of the
sentencing judge, a hearing to determine whether the Government had breached the
plea agreement, and vacatur of the sentence. Id at 8. The district court set aside Sevilla-
Oyola's original guilty plea and the second sentence, and it denied Sevilla-Oyola's re-
quests for recusal and a hearing on the plea agreement. Id at 8-9.
108 Id at 9.
109 Id at 15.
110 United States v Sevilla-Oyola, 753 F3d 309, 325 (lst Cir 2014), withdrawn and
superseded by 770 F3d 1.
111 Sevilla-Oyola, 770 F3d at 15.
112 Id at 16 n 26.
113 Id at 15.
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instructions, the court on rehearing modified the judgment to
vacate and remand for resentencing by the district court judge to
avoid the warning problem.114 In doing so, the rehearing court
indicated that because it was simply remanding the case, it was
not required to address Sevilla-Oyola's Greenlaw argument.115
The action in the initial First Circuit decision is clearly pro-
hibited by the express holding of Greenlaw. By reinstating the
original sentence, the appellate court ordered an increase in
Sevilla-Oyola's sentence despite the fact that the Government
had not appealed. The court did not acknowledge, let alone con-
sider, Greenlaw. If it had, it might have concluded that the ac-
tion at hand was distinguishable, because the court was actually
granting the defendant's requested relief (vacating the adjust-
ments) and the ultimate sentence following appeal was one al-
ready imposed by the district court-as opposed to the newly
created sentence in Greenlaw. Yet the fact remains that the ap-
pellate court ordered an increase in the sentence without a gov-
ernment appeal.
Because the First Circuit revoked the first remand, this po-
tential violation of Greenlaw loses some, but not all, of its poten-
cy. The court's reason for revocation was that the defendant had
not been warned that the appellate court might increase the
sentence, not that the appellate court lacked the authority to do
so. 116 This reasoning suggests that, had the defendant been
properly warned, the First Circuit would have found nothing
wrong with reinstating the original sentence itself.117 Yet while
the majority in Greenlaw indicated that notice to defendants is
one of the protections offered by the cross-appeal rule,118 the
Court did not suggest that its ban on sua sponte appellate error
correction could be overcome by merely informing defendants
that such error correction might occur.
Even the result reached at the rehearing can be seen as vio-
lating the functionalist approach to Greenlaw. None of the
findings made during the course of the rehearing was to Sevilla-
Oyola's benefit. The First Circuit first found no authorization
for any of the district court's modifications to the original
114 Id at 15-16.
115 Sevilla-Oyola, 770 F3d at 16 n 26.
116 See id at 15-16.
117 Had the court done so, it would have been required to address the defendant's
argument that this action violates Greenlaw, but instead the argument went untouched.
118 Greenlaw, 554 US at 252-53 ("The firm deadlines set by the Appellate Rules ad-
vance the interests of the parties and the legal system in fair notice and finality.").
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sentence-modifications that actually reduced Sevilla-Oyola's
sentence. 119 The court then determined that Sevilla-Oyola's chal-
lenge to the original (life) sentence based on an inadequate plea
colloquy was waived due to his failure to "adequately challenge
these errors on appeal.120 Despite the fact that the court made
no findings in the defendant's favor, it remanded the case for re-
sentencing in an effort to correct the potential problem created
by its previous reinstatement of the life sentence. However, the
only sentence the appellate court's reasoning left intact was the
initial life sentence, and the First Circuit remanded the case to
the same district court judge for resentencing.121 Although the
district court ultimately imposed a lower sentence of three hun-
dred months' imprisonment,122 this reduction was not required
by the appellate court's remand. When resentencing, the district
court could have interpreted Greenlaw in a formalist fashion and
concluded that it retained the power to increase the defendant's
sentence despite the absence of a government appeal. The possi-
bility of courts taking such actions in the future is increased by
the fact that the waiver and forfeiture doctrines would likely
have prevented the defendant from arguing against the life sen-
tence based on the inadequate plea colloquy.123 Although the de-
fendant in this case escaped a sentence increase following re-
mand for resentencing, a formalist interpretation of Greenlaw
makes it possible that similar defendants may not be so lucky.
2. Requiring additional explanation of sentencing
decisions.
Other appellate courts have required sentencing courts to
provide additional explanation for sentences that appear too
low, despite the fact that only the defendant appealed. In United
States v Anderson,124 the defendant was sentenced to forty-
eight months in prison for money-laundering in connection
119 Sevilla-Oyola, 770 F3d at 11, 13.
120 Id at 14.
121 Id at 15-16.
122 Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v Sevilla-Oyola, Criminal
Action No 10-00251, *2 (D Puerto Rico filed Dec 16, 2014).
123 It is not clear what arguments the defendant presented at resentencing in favor
of a reduced prison term. But a formalist interpretation of Greenlaw suggests that the
district court would have been within its authority to deny this avenue of argument to
the defendant.
124 526 F3d 319 (6th Cir 2008).
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with her son's multistate methamphetamine operation. 125 After
the district court calculated Anderson's base offense level, it
applied a two-level increase, a four-level decrease, and a three-
level decrease, resulting in an offense level of twenty-five.126 The
court then granted the Government's motion for an additional
three-level decrease, resulting in a final offense level of twenty-
two and a sentencing range of forty-one to fifty-one months.127
On appeal, Anderson argued that the base offense level should
have been lower or, alternatively, that Anderson (1) should have
received an additional two-level decrease and (2) should not
have received the two-level increase.128 The Government opposed
Anderson's request for resentencing, agreeing that Anderson
should have received an additional two-level decrease but also
noting that the four-level decrease granted to Anderson was in-
correct. 129 The Government ultimately requested that the sen-
tence remain unchanged.130
The Sixth Circuit rejected Anderson's arguments. It held
both that the base offense level was calculated correctly and that
the two-level increase was appropriate.131 The court also found,
as the Government argued, that Anderson should not have re-
ceived the four-level decrease. 132 Based on these determinations,
the court concluded that the final offense level should have been
twenty-four and the recommended sentencing range should have
been fifty-one to sixty-three months. 133 In holding that this error
was not harmless, the Sixth Circuit pointed to Gall v United
States,134 which requires sentencing courts to adequately explain
the reasons for a sentence when imposing terms outside of the
recommended Guidelines range. 135 The Sixth Circuit recognized
that, because of the errors made in the defendant's favor, the
125 Id at 321.
126 Id at 323. The Sixth Circuit indicated that the district court began with a base
offense level of thirty-two. Id. There is some ambiguity in the calculations used, but what
matters for the purposes of this Comment is that the Sixth Circuit ultimately concluded
that the district court's final offense-level calculation and the corresponding Guidelines
range were too low. Id at 328-29.
127 Id at 323.
128 Anderson, 526 F3d at 323.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id at 324, 328.
132 Anderson, 526 F3d at 328.
133 Id at 329.
134 552 US 38 (2007).
135 Id at 50.
2015] 1723
The University of Chicago Law Review
lower court in Anderson had actually imposed a sentence outside
of the recommended range and was therefore required to provide
an additional explanation of its sentence given the actual range
of fifty-one to sixty-three months.136
As in Sevilla-Qyola, the Sixth Circuit's actions did not vio-
late the formal holding of Greenlaw. The appellate court did not
require the district court to impose a sentence within the cor-
rected range of fifty-one to sixty-three months. In fact, at resen-
tencing the district court ultimately imposed the same forty-
eight month sentence. 1 7 However, this result was by no means a
foregone conclusion based on the appellate court's remand. It
was presumably more difficult for the district court to impose
the same sentence, as the district court was required to provide
additional explanation for the given prison term. Imposing a
sentence within the corrected (higher) range would have been
simpler. It is likely that courts in similar circumstances will
take this route in the future even when the government has not
advocated for a higher sentence on appeal. The Sixth Circuit
even acknowledged this "perverse result," stating that Anderson
was "likely to receive only a greater sentence on remand because
the Guidelines range will be higher."138 The court then noted
that this is a risk that defendants take on appeal,139 a premise
that clearly contradicts the characterization of Greenlaw as a
functional ban on any unrequested increase in response to a de-
fendant's appeal.
Requiring explanation of a sentence imposed outside of the
Guidelines is a recognized component of procedural-
reasonableness review.140 However, this type of appellate court
mandate inherently implies that the sentence imposed might
not be appropriate based on the record as presented. While
Anderson's arguments on appeal (regarding an incorrect calcu-
lation of the Guidelines range) all revolved around procedural
reasonableness, she did not request additional explanation of
her sentence. Greenlaw's prohibition against appellate courts
acting to benefit a nonappealing party should prevent the Sixth
136 Anderson, 526 F3d at 329-30, citing Gall, 552 US at 49-52.
137 Amended Judgment, United States v Anderson, Criminal Action No 05-92, *2
(ED Tenn filed Dec 1, 2008).
138 Anderson, 526 F3d at 331 n 7.
139 Id.
140 See Michael M. O'Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 Fla St U L Rev 459, 460-61
(2009) (describing the development of an explanation requirement as an aspect of proce-
dural reasonableness). See also text accompanying notes 32-34.
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Circuit from remanding based on a new range that benefits the
Government when it does not find merit in any of the defend-
ant's arguments. Had the court determined that the original
range used by the district court was too high, it would have been
within the scope of appellate review to require further explana-
tion since the lack of reasoning would then operate to the detri-
ment of the defendant. Based on Greenlaw, appellate courts
should remand for additional explanation only when they find
merit in the appealing party's argument that an error was
made. When none of the defendant's arguments supports the
conclusion that a sentencing error occurred, and the government
has not advanced any arguments of its own, the appropriate ap-
pellate court response is to let the original sentence stand.
3. Requiring recalculation of the Guidelines range.
Appellate courts have also required recalculation of the
Guidelines range based on errors that, if corrected, would disad-
vantage defendants. In United States v Rushton,'4' the defend-
ant pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud and one count of
money-laundering.142 The district judge sentenced Rushton to
ninety-six months in prison after applying a four-level en-
hancement for using a commodity pool to commit fraud and a
two-level enhancement for abuse of trust.43 Rushton appealed
on the grounds that the Guidelines prohibit applying these two
enhancements simultaneously; the Government agreed.144
In its appellate brief, the Government argued that the error
in sentencing was harmless because the district court also failed
to apply a two-level vulnerable-victim enhancement. 14 However,
the Government withdrew this argument based on Seventh Cir-
cuit precedent that "forbid[s] the government to seek additional
sentencing enhancements on remand from an unrelated sentenc-
ing appeal."146 The Government then argued that the district
court erred in basing the Guidelines calculation on only the
141 738 F3d 854 (7th Cir 2013).
142 Id at 855-56.
143 Id at 856.
144 Id.
145 Rushton, 738 F3d at 857. The Guidelines provide for a two-level increase if the
defendant knew or should have known that the victim was "vulnerable." USSG
§ 3A1.1(b)(1). The accompanying commentary defines a vulnerable victim as someone
who is "unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is other-
wise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct." USSG § 3A1.1, Application Note 2.
146 Rushton, 738 F3d at 857.
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fraud plea, as opposed to considering both the fraud and money-
laundering pleas. 14 The Government indicated that this added
consideration would make the correct Guidelines range the same
as the incorrectly calculated range used to obtain the original
sentence, and as a result the Government did not request a sen-
tence increase from the appellate court. 148
The Seventh Circuit found that the errors raised by the par-
ties (the inappropriate double counting, raised by the defendant,
and the sentence's failure to reflect the money-laundering plea,
raised by the Government) offset each other. 149 This finding
could have supported a determination that the error raised by
the defendant was harmless and therefore not grounds for re-
mand.150 Yet the Seventh Circuit nevertheless remanded the
case for resentencing based on the need for the district court to
consider the previously unapplied vulnerable-victim enhance-
ment-an argument withdrawn by the Government that could
have only increased the defendant's sentence. 151 The court said:
The alternative to ordering resentencing would be to pro-
nounce the errors not plain because they were offsetting:
the enhancement for abuse of trust was wrong, but so was
the judge's failure to sentence under the money laundering
guideline. But that ignores the judge's failure to impose a
further enhancement, or enhancements, for the presence of
a vulnerable victim, or vulnerable victims. That was anoth-
er error.
152
The court further indicated that a higher sentence on remand
would not be per se unreasonable as long as its imposition were
not vindictive. 153
In this case, like the others before it, the appellate court
itself did not explicitly impose an increased sentence. One
147 Id at 858.
148 Id at 858-60.
149 Id at 858.
150 See Williams v United States, 503 US 193, 203 (1992) ("If the party defending the
sentence persuades the court of appeals that the district court would have imposed
the same sentence absent the erroneous factor ... the court of appeals may affirm
the sentence.").
151 Rushton, 738 F3d at 860.
152 Id.
153 Id. The rule against vindictiveness is derived from Pearce, in which the Court
noted that "the fear of [ ] vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exer-
cise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction." Pearce, 395 US at
725. See also Part II.A.2.
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might even argue that the court's actions in Rushton are more
acceptable than those in Anderson, because in Rushton the ap-
pellate court found merit in at least one of the defendant's argu-
ments: the argument that the district court inappropriately dou-
ble counted. But the tenor of the Rushton opinion indicates that
whether the district court ignores or corrects the offsetting er-
rors, it will also have to consider the unaddressed vulnerable-
victim enhancement-an error that can only work to the de-
fendant's detriment.154 The most likely result on remand is
therefore an increase in sentence based on an error not raised
by the Government, a result that the Seventh Circuit explicit-
ly acknowledged:
[A] defendant who appeals from a sentence takes a risk
that if the case is remanded for resentencing, as the de-
fendant in this case urges be done, he will receive a longer
sentence should the court of appeals notice an error in his
favor committed in the sentencing proceeding that he has
appealed.155
The Seventh Circuit effectively paved the way for an increase by
indicating that nonvindictive impositions of higher sentences are
not per se unreasonable.156 The appellate court's recognition of
an error makes it unlikely that the district court will ignore this
error when given the opportunity to correct itself. Thus, the de-
fendant will suffer the same adverse consequences he might
have suffered if the appellate court itself had engaged in sua
sponte adjustment of his sentence.
Rushton and the cases preceding it demonstrate that an ex-
plicit order is not the only appellate response that can lead to a
potential sentence increase when the government has not ap-
pealed. The fact that these cases hardly mention Greenlaw em-
phasizes courts' failure to understand the breadth of Greenlaw's
restrictions. As described below, this misinterpretation leads to
problematic conflicts with the spirit of Greenlaw and other
precedents.
154 See Rushton, 738 F3d at 861 ("Ve cannot predict what sentence the district
judge will impose on remand; it is unlikely to be shorter but uncertain whether it will be
longer.").
155 Id at 860-61.
156 Id.
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C. Potential Implications of the Cases following Greenlaw
The cases discussed in the previous Section demonstrate
the need for a functionalist interpretation of Greenlaw. This
Section argues that Greenlaw must be understood as prohibit-
ing not only explicit increases by the appellate court but also
other actions that achieve the same result. This Section then
briefly discusses how this functionalist interpretation of Greenlaw
bears on district courts' authority at resentencing.
1. Circumstances warranting appellate action.
Greenlaw explicitly prohibits increases imposed by appellate
courts but also creates confusion about limitations on other ap-
pellate court actions. This Section focuses on three possible ap-
pellate court actions: (1) remand when there is only the likeli-
hood, and not the certainty, of a sentence increase; (2) remand
when the defendant is the only party requesting it and the court
has rejected all of the defendant's arguments; and (3) remand
when the court accepts some of the defendant's arguments but
has discovered greater errors whose correction would disad-
vantage the defendant. A formalist interpretation of Greenlaw
indicates that all of these actions are permissible but also intro-
duces inconsistencies into sentencing review. A functionalist in-
terpretation resolves these inconsistencies by broadening the re-
strictions on appellate courts and denying their ability to
remand under any of these circumstances.
The first question arising out of the Greenlaw decision is
whether appellate courts act within their authority when they
remand a case following a defendant's appeal when it is likely
that the remand will only hurt the defendant. For example, An-
derson was remanded despite the fact that only the defendant
appealed and despite the court's determination that the district
court made no error detrimental to the defendant.157 The entire
basis for remand was to require additional justification of a sen-
tence that was arguably too low.158 If Greenlaw is read formally
(that is, as forbidding only the direct imposition of an increased
sentence by an appellate court), then Anderson does not violate
this precedent.
However, the dicta in Greenlaw suggest that it should be
read otherwise. By pointing out that the decision did not affect
157 Anderson, 526 F3d at 321.
158 See id at 330-31 & n 7.
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sentencing-package cases, Greenlaw emphasized that sentence
increases following a defendant's successful appeal are accepta-
ble only if the defendant ultimately loses nothing.159 The dicta
thus support a more functionalist interpretation: if the govern-
ment has not appealed, an appellate court cannot take any ac-
tion that results in a loss to the defendant.160 If a case is re-
manded following the defendant's appeal and the only possible
basis for action is the correction of an error made in the defend-
ant's favor, it is highly unlikely that the remand will result in
anything other than the defendant's loss. This result should
make the very action of remanding invalid under Greenlaw-
despite the fact that it is often done at the defendant's request-
because the district court's interpretation of the mandate creat-
ed by the remand will likely favor the government. Similarly,
district courts cannot adjust a sentence following a defendant's
appeal if the result would make the defendant worse off.
Sevilla-Oyola and Rushton present similar situations. While
the appellate courts did not impose increased sentences them-
selves, remanding without finding any of the defendants' argu-
ments valid constitutes an appellate action that advantages the
nonappealing party. Under these circumstances, the most likely
outcome is an increased sentence. In such a case, the appellate
court should dismiss the appeal, as the appealing party has not
justified its requested relief and the Government has not re-
quested anything.
Under a formalist reading of Greenlaw, appellate courts can
remand for resentencing as long as they themselves do not im-
pose a higher sentence, even when a sentence increase is one
possible result. The majority's holding-which only explicitly
bars direct sentence increases by appellate courts-suggests
that a remand for resentencing could be appropriate, especially
if remand is what the defendant himself requested. However,
this is the same action taken by the appellate court in Green-
law-an action that the Supreme Court ultimately found objec-
tionable. The appellate court remanded with instructions that
the district court impose the correct (higher) statutory mini-
mum.16 ' The Court implied that this order was akin to the appel-
late court itself imposing a higher sentence. 162
159 See text accompanying notes 91-93.
160 See Part II.A.1.
161 Greenlaw, 554 US at 243.
162 Id at 240.
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The next question is whether the appellate court in Green-
law could have, after reviewing all of Greenlaw's arguments and
finding them meritless, remanded the case for resentencing
without explicit instructions. This approach appears slightly less
objectionable because the appellate court would not have gone
out of its way to point out an error made in the defendant's favor
and therefore would not have explicitly encouraged the district
court to revisit any particular issue at resentencing. Again, a
formalist interpretation might allow this approach, but a func-
tionalist interpretation should prohibit it. In such a case, the
appellate court should have to acknowledge that it is not re-
manding based on the defendant's arguments and that it is in-
stead doing so based solely on a self-discovered error that was
made in the defendant's favor and can be corrected only to his
detriment.
A final scenario is that an appellate court might remand af-
ter finding a legitimate error made to the defendant's detriment,
despite also finding that other errors in the defendant's favor
would cancel out or even override any advantage the defendant
could possibly receive on remand. This scenario is precisely what
occurred in Rushton, and there is an argument that this action
is permissible because the appellate court was merely granting
the defendant's request for remand after concluding that he
made a valid argument. However, as explained in more detail
below, the mandate rule makes it highly unlikely that a district
court would be empowered to resentence with only the defend-
ant's advantages in mind after the appellate court acknowledged
the necessity of considering all of these errors. Thus, the result
will likely be the same: a sentence increase that no one has re-
quested. Regardless of whether an increase on remand is guar-
anteed or likely, or whether the appellate court has explicitly
identified an error that would benefit the defendant, Greenlaw
requires that appellate courts refrain from remanding cases
when evaluation of the errors in sentencing suggests that re-
mand would result in a sentence increase.
2. Implications for district courts.
This Comment's interpretation of Greenlaw as a functional
restriction coalesces around a singular focus: the likely outcome
at resentencing. As discussed above, appellate courts should lim-
it their responses when the government has not appealed, based
on the likely result at resentencing. In Greenlaw, the Court
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appeared to rely on the appellate court's ability to self-restrict
and did not explicitly prohibit the district court from increasing
the defendant's sentence in response to the defendant's suc-
cessful appeal. Yet a functionalist interpretation of Greenlaw
raises questions as to whether district courts should be similar-
ly restricted.
The Ninth Circuit comprehensively discussed this concern
in United States v Beltran-Moreno.163 The defendants each
pleaded guilty to two charges of firearm possession in violation
of § 924(c) (the same statute under which Greenlaw was convict-
ed), which imposes an increased mandatory minimum for multi-
ple convictions.164 By statute, their sentences should have been
at least forty years but the district court imposed only thirty-five
years based on improper calculations.165 On appeal, the defend-
ants argued that their sentences should have been fifteen years;
the Government did not appeal or cross-appeal.166 The Ninth
Circuit indicated that if it were to alter the defendants' sentenc-
es, the only possible result would be an increase of at least five
years. Because the Government had not appealed, however,
Greenlaw foreclosed this action.167 The court went on to say that
even if it were to remand the case, "the district court would not
be permitted to raise [the defendants'] mandatory minimum
sentence[s] sua sponte following the government's failure to ap-
peal," citing the Greenlaw majority opinion.68 But the court also
acknowledged that it is hard to imagine that the lower court, in
response to vacatur and remand, would ignore the fact that its
original sentence was statutorily inadequate.169 The Ninth Cir-
cuit also did not plainly state that the Government would be
barred from requesting that the district court increase the sen-
tence. If the sentence had been vacated in its entirety, the dis-
trict court could likely have considered an argument by the Gov-
ernment for an increase based on a more accurate calculation of
the mandatory minimum. Precedent discussed in the next Sec-
tion provides good reason to think that district courts are typi-
cally less restricted than appellate courts at resentencing. But a
functionalist understanding of Greenlaw inherently requires
163 556 F3d 913 (9th Cir 2009).
164 Id at 915.
165 Id at 915-16.
166 Id at 916-17.
167 Beltran-Moreno, 556 F3d at 917.
168 Id, citing Greenlaw, 554 US at 254 n 8.
169 Beltran-Moreno, 556 F3d at 917.
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limitations on district court authority, and therefore an appel-
late court should not remand without confining the scope of the
district court's authority in some way.
D. District Court Authority at Resentencing
There is substantial precedent that currently frames district
court authority at resentencing. Generally, district courts enjoy
wide latitude when an appellate court has vacated a sentence
and remanded a case. However, Greenlaw fails to effectively ad-
dress how this power interacts with the prohibition on sua spon-
te appellate error correction. A functionalist interpretation
demonstrates that district courts must also be more limited in
their ability to correct errors at resentencing.
1. Existing restrictions on resentencing.
Alito's dissent in Greenlaw expresses concern over the dis-
parity that the decision created regarding district courts' author-
ity to increase sentences after a remand granted on the basis of
a defendant's appeal.170 In Pearce, the Court held that when "a
judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a
new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively ap-
pear."'171 In a subsequent case, the Court indicated that this
standard creates a "presumption of vindictiveness" to be applied
whenever a defendant's appeal results in an increased sen-
tence. 172 This limitation on sentence increases has since been
narrowed.173 The Court has recognized that the limitation ap-
plies not in every case of an increased sentence but only when
there is a reasonable likelihood "that the increase in sentence
is the product of actual vindictiveness."'174 The result is an af-
firmative burden on defendants to demonstrate either a rea-
sonable likelihood or the actual presence of vindictiveness.
While Pearce applied specifically to retrials, it has subsequently
been interpreted as imposing the same standard on increases
at resentencing. 175
In Greenlaw, Alito pointed out that Greenlaw and Pearce in-
teract to create an apparent absurdity in which district courts
170 Greenlaw, 554 US at 264-66 (Alito dissenting), citing Pearce, 395 US at 719-20.
171 Pearce, 395 US at 726.
172 United States v Goodwin, 457 US 368, 374 (1982).
173 See Smith, 490 US at 799-800.
174 Id at 799.
175 See United States v Singletary, 458 F3d 72, 75-77 (2d Cir 2006).
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are permitted to correct an error that appellate courts must
leave untouched, as uncorrected errors are likely to constitute
affirmative reasons to modify sentences. 176 The majority re-
sponded by indicating that district courts would be confined by
the doctrines of default and forfeiture, and that therefore this
troublesome result would be unlikely to occur.77 However, sub-
sequent Supreme Court precedent suggests that the dissent's
concern is well founded. Most importantly, the Court has indi-
cated that district courts are not bound at resentencing by the
same determinations used at the original sentencing.178 In Pep-
per v United States,179 the defendant was sentenced to twenty-
four months in prison partially based on a 40 percent downward
departure for substantial assistance. 18o The case was then ap-
pealed twice by the Government, after which the sentence was
vacated and the case was remanded. 181 At resentencing, a new
judge employed a departure of only 20 percent.182
Pepper argued that because the sentence was vacated on
grounds unrelated to the substantial-assistance departure, the
resentencing court should have been precluded from using a dif-
ferent departure percentage. 183 The Court rejected this argu-
ment, indicating that a general remand does not place any limits
on the discretion of the judge at resentencing.184 Rather, de novo
resentencing "effectively wipe[s] the slate clean.185 The Court
then cited Greenlaw for the proposition that in reversing one as-
pect of a defendant's sentence, "an appellate court . . . 'may va-
cate the entire sentence ... so that, on remand, the trial court
176 Greenlaw, 554 US at 265 n 2 (Alito dissenting) ("If the Court permits sentencing
courts to correct unappealed errors on remand, why does it not permit the courts of ap-
peals to do the same on appeal?").
177 Id at 254 n 8 (noting that default and forfeiture doctrines "confine the trial court"
and that it "would therefore be hard to imagine a case in which a district court .. could
properly increase the sentence based on an error the appeals court left uncorrected be-
cause of the cross-appeal rule").
178 See Pepper v United States, 562 US 476, 480-81, 505 (2011).
179 562 US 476 (2011).
180 Id at 483.
181 Id at 482-84.
182 Id at 485. Following resentencing, Pepper was sentenced to sixty-five months of
imprisonment. Id at 486. Although Pepper ultimately lost on resentencing, this case does
not implicate the same concerns as Greenlaw, because the Government was the appeal-
ing party. However, the Court's analysis of what binds a resentencing court is relevant to
the additional concerns raised in Greenlaw.
183 Pepper, 562 US at 505-06.
184 Id at 506.
185 Id at 507.
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can reconfigure the sentencing plan ... to satisfy the sentencing
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)."'1 86 This authority is similar to
what Greenlaw indicated about sentencing-package cases-that
reversal of some elements inherently demands that the district
court be permitted to reconsider all elements.'18 The net result is
that, at least following general remands, a district court may re-
visit issues that the appellate court did not address. Pepper de-
finitively demonstrates that this authority exists when the re-
sentencing court acts to benefit the appealing party. But a
question still remains as to whether the same is true when the
district court acts to benefit the nonappealing party. Without a
functionalist reading of Greenlaw, it appears that district courts
are not restricted from making changes to a defendant's detri-
ment, despite the Court's indication in Greenlaw that a defend-
ant should not lose following a successful appeal.
2. Considering the restrictions as applied to the
nonappealing party.
Other cases also contradict the Greenlaw majority's asser-
tion that a district court will not correct an error to the defend-
ant's detriment when the appellate court has left it unresolved.
In United States v Ward,188 the defendant pleaded guilty to mul-
tiple charges related to child pornography.189 Ward's sentence in-
cluded a three-hundred-month prison term, a $100,000 fine, and
a $500 special assessment. 190 On his first appeal, Ward argued
that the district court had given insufficient reasons for impos-
ing the fine and that his sentence was "an impermissible general
sentence."'191 The Third Circuit first found that, while the district
court erred in failing to provide a justification for the fine, this
failure was not plain error and was therefore not grounds for
remand.192 But the court agreed with Ward's second argument-
that his sentence was impermissibly general-and remanded
the case for resentencing to convert the general sentence into
186 Id, quoting Greenlaw, 554 US at 253.
187 Greenlaw, 554 US at 253.
188 732 F3d 175 (3d Cir 2013).
189 Id at 179.
190 Id.
191 Id. A general sentence is "an undivided sentence for more than one count that
does not exceed the maximum possible aggregate sentence for all the counts but does ex-
ceed the maximum allowable sentence on one of the counts." United States v Woodard,
938 F2d 1255, 1256 (lith Cir 1991).
192 Ward, 732 F3d at 179.
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separate sentences for each count of the indictment. 193 The dis-
trict court responded by imposing the same prison sentence but
increasing the fine to $250,000.194 In doing so, it explicitly
acknowledged that this correction was based on the Third Cir-
cuit's identification of its error in failing to provide justification
for the fine.195 Ward appealed this increase on the grounds that
it was vindictive, but the Third Circuit rejected this argument
and concluded that the alteration was properly based on the dis-
trict court's recognition of its original failure to provide justifica-
tion for the fine.196
Ward demonstrates the precise set of contradictions that the
Greenlaw dissent was concerned about. The failure to provide a
justification for the fine was an error that the appellate court
identified but left uncorrected by remanding on a different basis.
Yet the district court used this same error to justify a subse-
quent increase at resentencing, despite the fact that remand had
been ordered at the defendant's request and for his benefit. As
established in Pepper, the resentencing court in Ward was not
bound by any of the determinations of the original sentencing
court-even those left untouched by the appellate court-and
therefore was able to increase the sentence based on this er-
ror.197 Either the Greenlaw majority was mistaken in disregard-
ing the anomaly between this district court power and the lack
of appellate court authority, or else the district court's action
contravened the Greenlaw Court's true intention to create a
functional ban on sentence increases in response to the defend-
ant's appeal.
3. Considering waiver and forfeiture.
The Greenlaw majority attempted to cast aside this concern
based on the fact that, although district courts are not confined
by the cross-appeal rule, they are confined by the rules of default
and forfeiture. 198 The Court made this point briefly and did not
elaborate. While Greenlaw did not address the issue of waiver, it
193 Id.
194 Id at 180.
195 Id at 184.
196 Ward, 732 F3d at 184.
197 See Pepper, 562 US at 505-06.
198 Greenlaw, 554 US at 254 n 8.
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is strongly implicated by other precedent and presents an im-
portant limitation on parties facing appeal.199
However, when defining the district court's ability to resen-
tence following a general remand, the Pepper Court did not indi-
cate that this ability was in any way restricted by those princi-
ples.200 It is possible that these doctrines may permit a
resentencing court to ignore new arguments presented by a non-
appealing party, but it does not seem as though they would re-
quire the court to pass over any consideration of error. Pepper is
not an ideal example of the concerns raised by Greenlaw, be-
cause Pepper was remanded on the basis of the Government's
appeal and the sua sponte reduction of the downward departure
was made to the benefit of the Government (that is, the appeal-
ing party).201 But nothing in the language of the Pepper opinion
suggests that this broad power to revisit sentences under the
guise of a general remand is in any sense limited by the per-
ceived beneficiary of the remand. Yet the Greenlaw majority
seemed to reject this very possibility and also suggested in dicta
that resentencing on the basis of a defendant's appeal should
never result in an aggregate increase in the sentence. 202
The mandate rule can prevent lower courts from revisiting
particular issues on remand. In United States v Pileggi,203 the
defendant was both sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to
pay restitution.24 He appealed, and the appellate court vacated
and remanded for resentencing after concluding that the prison
term was based on the district court's reliance on an erroneous
view of the facts.205 Significantly, the amount of restitution was
completely unaddressed during the Fourth Circuit's initial re-
view of the sentence-its only mention was in a brief footnote
describing the components of the original sentence that was
the basis for the appeal.206 The resentencing court ultimately
199 See, for example, United States v Arroyo-Gonzales, 316 Fed Appx 761, 763 (10th
Cir 2009) ("[A] party who fails to make a timely objection to the magistrate judge's find-
ings and recommendations waives appellate review of both the factual and legal ques-
tions.") (quotation marks omitted); United States v Vieke, 348 F3d 811, 813 (9th Cir
2003) ("Objections to a sentence not presented to the district court generally cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.").
200 Pepper, 562 US at 505-06.
201 Id at 483-85.
202 Greenlaw, 554 US at 254 & n 8.
203 703 F3d 675 (4th Cir 2013).
204 Id at 678.
205 Id.
206 United States v Pileggi, 361 Fed Appx 475, 477 n 5 (4th Cir 2010).
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imposed a shorter prison term but also increased the restitution
amount from $4 million to over $20 million, after which Pileggi
again appealed.207
On his second appeal, Pileggi argued that the mandate rule
prevented the district court from revisiting the amount of resti-
tution.28 The Fourth Circuit agreed, indicating that "[n]either
party had raised the issue before [the] Court, and the govern-
ment [was] not permitted to use the accident of a remand to
raise ... an issue that [it] could just as well have raised in the
first appeal."209 This statement contradicts the Supreme Court's
conclusion in Pepper that a general remand wipes the slate
clean. However, the Fourth Circuit concluded, for two reasons,
that these authorities do not conflict. First, the remand in Pep-
per was general, whereas in Pileggi the court vacated only the
prison term.210 Second, the court indicated that Pepper still oper-
ates within the context of waiver and that the Government
waived this argument by not raising it during the first appeal.211
That is, if the Government makes an appeal for a higher sen-
tence only on grounds A and B, it cannot on remand request a
higher sentence based on C when it did not raise C on appeal.
However, if the Government does not appeal and the remand is
granted solely based on the defendant's request, the Govern-
ment does not waive any arguments. Therefore, these cases sug-
gest that the government can sometimes make an argument on
remand on the basis of some error acknowledged but uncorrect-
ed by the appellate court. Further, Pepper seemed to give broad
authority to the resentencing court to revisit the error on its
own. Even absent the government's ability to argue for the cor-
rection of an error pointed out by the appellate court, there is
still a concern that district courts could correct it sua sponte and
ultimately hurt the appealing party.212
The Seventh Circuit has also noted that Pepper explicitly
permitted only the introduction of postsentencing rehabilitation
207 Pileggi, 703 F3d at 678-79.
208 Id at 679.
209 Id at 680 (quotation marks omitted).
210 Id.
211 Pileggi, 703 F3d at 680 ("Pepper does not abolish waiver in the context of re-
sentencing.") (quotation marks omitted).
212 There is a potential argument that monetary fines should be approached differ-
ently than terms of imprisonment for the purposes of appellate review of criminal sen-
tencing. Monetary fines are typically seen as less of a threat to individual liberties than
incarceration. However, nothing in the language of Greenlaw suggests that its holding is
limited to prison terms.
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evidence at resentencing and that this permission did not
"equate to carte blanche for defendants to raise new arguments
unrelated to the issues raised on appeal."213 The court made this
assertion in response to defendants who successfully appealed
and then attempted to make new arguments for decreased sen-
tences on remand. But it is unclear how this decision might ap-
ply to the nonappealing party. If the defendant is not given
broad ability to raise new arguments at resentencing, a nonap-
pealing party should be even further restricted on remand due
to the fact that it raised no arguments on appeal. A functionalist
interpretation of Greenlaw would restrict district court action in
this way.
III. RESOLVING THE DISCREPANCIES
The appellate court cases discussed above create unneces-
sary confusion in appellate sentencing authority and can disin-
centivize defendants from exercising their right to appeal. More
importantly, the cases violate a functionalist interpretation of
Greenlaw, which should be read to restrict both appellate and
district courts. These negative effects can be avoided by more ef-
fective employment of the mandate rule combined with a broad-
er interpretation of Greenlaw.
A. Why Sua Sponte Increases Should Be Avoided
A functionalist understanding of Greenlaw would admitted-
ly restrict the power of both appellate and district courts to ad-
dress mistakes during review and remand. This understanding
appears to run counter to the ideal function of appellate courts:
ensuring accurate application of the law.214 While there are ar-
guments in favor of fewer restrictions at the review stage, none
is sufficient to override the problems that permitting sua sponte
increases would create for defendants. This Section offers sever-
al possible justifications for the formalist understanding of
Greenlaw and rejects each as insufficient to advance the protec-
tions intended by the Greenlaw majority.
213 United States v Barnes, 660 F3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir 2011).
214 See Hessick and Hessick, 60 Ala L Rev at 3 (cited in note 14) ('This conflict be-
tween the need for district court discretion and the Court's decision to retain appellate
review has led the Court to abandon the core functions of appellate review--error correc-
tion and lawmaking."); Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 Ind L J 49, 49 (2010)
("Most depictions of appellate courts suggest that they serve two core functions: the crea-
tion and refinement of law and the correction of error.").
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1. Expected function of appellate courts.
One argument in favor of fewer restrictions on appellate
courts is that comprehensive review better aligns with the ex-
pected function of the appellate review process. Courts that en-
gage in broader review are presumably discovering and correct-
ing errors, and therefore delivering decisions that more
accurately adhere to the law. In the context of criminal ap-
peals, this would theoretically lead to a more just result.215 If
the criminal-justice system is to function properly, it may be in
society's best interest to ensure that defendants receive a pre-
cisely appropriate punishment, no more and (just as important-
ly) no less.216 Otherwise, the system may not obtain the desired
degree of deterrence or incapacitation of those who have already
been found guilty. If appellate courts were permitted to engage
in sua sponte error correction, sentences would be more accurate
than if courts were prevented from addressing them. A function-
alist interpretation of Greenlaw seemingly magnifies the prob-
lem by preventing both appellate and district courts from mak-
ing adjustments that would otherwise promote sentencing
accuracy.
Accuracy is also a justification for sua sponte correction in a
broader sense. This justification seems to require sua sponte
correction not only in the context of criminal sentencing but in
other areas of law as well. Yet the Supreme Court has not shown
any desire to abandon the concept of party presentation alto-
gether. The adversarial ideal has proven paramount over abso-
lute accuracy. 17 Further, absolute accuracy in sentencing is not
the entire measure of a successful criminal-justice system. 218
215 See Frost, 59 Duke L J at 509 (cited in note 44) ("[Clourts must on occasion es-
chew the party presentation rule to avoid issuing decisions containing erroneous state-
ments of law.").
216 See Chapman v United States, 500 US 453, 473 n 10 (1991) ("[A] sentence that is
unjustifiably low is ... plainly unfair to the public.") (quotation marks omitted). See also
Nancy J. King and Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Pol-
icy, 55 Duke L J 209, 214 (2005) (noting that sentencing reformers were concerned with
"both unwarranted leniency and arbitrary punishment").
217 See Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System,
64 Ind L J 301, 317 (1989) (noting that because "the principal criticism of the adversary
system is that it masks the 'truth,"' defenders of the system instead focus on "the preser-
vation of individual dignity" as a justification for the adversarial system).
218 See Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty: Appellate Review and the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 66 S Cal L Rev 621, 624 (1992) (noting that "disparity reduction,"
"departure control," "fine-tuning," and "common law development" are also goals of ap-
pellate review of the criminal-justice system).
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There is equal interest in the protections provided by procedural
justice, such as the government meeting its burden of proof,
which requires occasionally forsaking the upper limits of pun-
ishment in the interest of guaranteeing the constitutional pro-
tections of due process. This process relies on requiring parties
to raise issues for review and request relief. Permitting sua
sponte error correction would often require the consideration of
issues not raised and the granting of relief not requested. Fur-
ther, the Court in Greenlaw repeatedly emphasized that the
statutory provisions governing appellate review of sentences are
intended to "entrust[] to certain Government officials the deci-
sion whether to appeal an illegally low sentence.219 The Court
explicitly indicated that an interpretation of the statute permit-
ting appellate courts to act sua sponte would enable appellate
courts to trump the officials' decisions, a result the Court found
inconsistent with the intent underlying the statute.20 Permit-
ting sua sponte appellate error correction-or even district court
correction-would violate the emphasis that the Court has
placed on party autonomy and the ability to guide one's own
appeal.
2. Principle of notice.
Another argument in favor of a formalist reading is based
on the principle of notice. The Supreme Court in Greenlaw was
concerned that sua sponte sentence increases by appellate courts
result in unfair surprise to defendants who have no reason to
anticipate an increase. One might argue that this notice concern
is sufficiently mitigated under a formalist understanding of
Greenlaw. Defendants who receive an increased sentence from
the district court on remand may not be presented with the
same surprise, given that they had the opportunity to make ad-
ditional arguments at resentencing. The Seventh Circuit in
Rushton said as much when it indicated that appealing defend-
ants take the risk that remand will result in a longer sentence.221
If defendants are not so limited at resentencing, the Greenlaw
Court's concern about notice does not justify a functionalist in-
terpretation of the case that similarly restricts district courts.
219 See, for example, Greenlaw, 554 US at 251.
220 See id.
221 Rushton, 738 F3d at 860.
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But sentence increases by the district court also raise notice
concerns. The waiver and forfeiture doctrines likely limit the ar-
guments that can be made on remand.222 A defendant who suc-
cessfully brings an appeal may be unable to raise arguments
that are not made on appeal, and a narrow reading of Greenlaw
does not solve the similar notice concerns that arise in this situ-
ation. Appellate courts imposing sua sponte increases often rely
on errors not raised by the parties; defendants are therefore de-
nied notice that these errors may be relevant and, more im-
portantly, denied the opportunity to effectively argue against in-
creases. While defendants facing the possibility of an increase on
remand have the ability, in theory, to present arguments before
resentencing, in practice they will be prevented from raising
many arguments if they could have raised those issues on ap-
peal and failed to do so. The Seventh Circuit has indicated that
"any issue that could have been raised on appeal but was not is
waived and, therefore, not remanded.223 In these circumstances,
the government has not requested an increase or presented any
arguments in support of this result on appeal. Defendants there-
fore will not have advanced any arguments to oppose this possi-
bility. At resentencing, the confines of waiver and forfeiture will
likely prevent defendants from making arguments they other-
wise would have used to oppose an increase, on the grounds that
they did not raise those arguments on appeal. Under a narrow
reading of Greenlaw, defendants would be just as limited in
their ability to respond to unanticipated arguments on remand
as they would be in a world in which sua sponte correction were
permitted. A broad reading of Greenlaw is the only way to pre-
vent defendants from being blindsided with arguments to which
they have lost the ability to respond.
Further, relying on the problem of notice as the sole basis
for the formalist interpretation of Greenlaw suggests that warn-
ing defendants of the possibility of an increase would cure the
problem. The First Circuit clearly endorsed this view in Sevilla-
Oyola, as it would have reinstated the increased sentence had
the defendant received proper warning of this possibility.224
But this view does not entirely resolve the notice issues
acknowledged in Greenlaw. There, the Court specified that
this notice interest importantly permits the defendant to "tailor
222 See Part I.D.3.
223 United States v Barnes, 660 F3d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir 2011).
224 Sevilla-Oyola, 770 F3d at 15. See also text accompanying notes 113-15.
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his arguments to take account of' the fact that "pursuit of his
appeal exposes him to the risk of a higher sentence."225 Giving
the defendant general notice that his appeal might result in an
increased sentence does not aid his ability to tailor his argu-
ments to respond to the possible justifications for an increase.
Otherwise, an appellate court could presumably give a general
warning, hear the defendant's appeal, and then use an error
that had not been raised by either party to justify an increase
without enabling the defendant to respond to the basis for the
increase. The notice interest that Greenlaw so heavily relied on
requires that a defendant facing the possibility of an increased
sentence be aware of both the general possibility of and the po-
tential basis for an increase so that he may respond effectively.
A formalist interpretation of Greenlaw would not provide full
protection of the notice interest that the majority claimed to
advance.
3. Accuracy in criminal sentencing.
The particular context of criminal sentencing might provide
justification for sua sponte error correction. Accurate deci-
sionmaking is particularly important when the risk of error in-
cludes a potential increase in prison time. Prior to the creation
of the Guidelines, similarly situated defendants sentenced by
different judges were often subject to disparate sentences. 26
Congress explicitly cited the reduction of these sentencing dis-
parities as a goal of the Guidelines.227 This concern suggests that
sentencing errors should be corrected regardless of whether they
are raised by the parties. Allowing errors in the application of
the Guidelines to go uncorrected is likely to increase, not de-
crease, disparities among defendants. For example, if in Ander-
son the defendant's sentence had been based on an incorrect cal-
culation of the Guidelines range, as indicated by the Sixth
Circuit, he would inherently have been treated more favorably
than other defendants who had committed similar offenses.228
Permitting sua sponte correction would help ensure that these
types of disparities do not occur.
But the shift in Booker from mandatory to advisory applica-
tion of the Guidelines suggests that individual considerations in
225 Greenlaw, 554 US at 253.
226 See Rust, Comment, 26 Touro L Rev at 78 (cited in note 34).
227 See Booker, 543 US at 253.
228 See text accompanying notes 125-36.
1742 [82:1705
Truth or Unintended Consequences
sentencing are at least as significant as uniformity in sentenc-
ing. The Court indicated that the sentencing system remaining
after Booker would "help[ ] to avoid excessive sentencing dispari-
ties while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sen-
tences.229 The Court appeared to reject the robotic application of
predetermined sentences without any room for the variables in-
herent in an adjudicative system, which inevitably include the
possibility that the government will choose not to seek the high-
est possible sentence by correcting an error.
4. Efficiency.
Another argument for sua sponte review is that permitting
such appellate error correction promotes efficiency. Defendants
would be encouraged to thoroughly review potential arguments
for appeal and presumably would not proceed if they did not
perceive a strong possibility of improving the outcomes they re-
ceived at the district court level. Defendants would have to eval-
uate any unappealed errors made to their benefit and thus
might be encouraged to make a more considered use of the re-
view process. Practically speaking, allowing sua sponte correc-
tion might even eliminate some nonmeritorious appeals by dis-
couraging defendants from risking long-shot arguments in light
of the risk of exposing errors that actually worked in their favor.
Yet there seem to be equally compelling efficiency interests
advanced by prohibiting sua sponte error correction, some of
which were highlighted by the majority in Greenlaw.230 A de-
fendant who does not face a cross-appeal would be provided
some closure in "anticipating that the appellate court will not
enlarge his sentence.231 The review process would be narrowly
circumscribed to cover only those arguments that might lead to
a sentence decrease, and judicial resources would not be con-
sumed on issues not briefed by the parties. Finally, the efficien-
cy arguments in favor of sua sponte correction may be better rel-
egated to the context of private claims, in which parties can turn
from appellate review to private settlement to achieve a more
equitable solution while still taking advantage of errors made to
their detriment. In the criminal context, defendants would be
faced with an all-or-nothing option of either pursuing their
229 Booker, 543 US at 264-65.
230 Greenlaw, 554 US at 252.
231 Id.
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appeals with the risk of a net increase or forgoing the possibility
of a decrease altogether.
5. Prosecutorial caseloads.
A final argument for sua sponte review is that prosecutors'
heavy caseloads inherently prevent them from appealing every
improper sentencing decision. Appellate courts therefore should
respond to errors as they arise because they would otherwise
face them infrequently. However, this reasoning situates the
court not as a neutral arbiter but rather as an aid to the prose-
cution, because, while it is possible for sua sponte review to ben-
efit the defendant,232 it is more likely to benefit the prosecu-
tion.33 This argument should therefore be viewed with
skepticism because courts should be particularly reluctant to re-
linquish neutrality at the expense of criminal defendants.
** *
Despite these perceived justifications, an appellate court's
ability to effectuate a sentence increase in response to a defend-
ant's appeal, even without imposing the increase itself, is likely
to disincentivize defendants who have discovered valid errors to
their detriment from pursuing these issues on appeal if they be-
lieve there is any chance that the court will find errors in their
favor.234 This result would produce an inefficient number of ap-
peals, whereby egregious errors committed to defendants' detri-
ment would go unaddressed. Defendants confronting sua sponte
review would face the possibility of a longer sentence and there-
fore a greater risk in exercising their right to appeal than the
government would face in choosing to appeal. This might cause
defendants to appeal with less frequency overall, meaning that
errors made to their detriment would presumably be addressed
and corrected less often.
232 See Part III.D.
233 This is due to what many consider a bias in favor of the prosecution in criminal
cases. See, for example, Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convic-
tions, 90 Wash U L Rev 1133, 1171 (2013) ("Ample evidence [ suggests that judges often
are biased toward the prosecution.").
234 See Gregory M. Dyer and Brendan Judge, Note, Criminal Defendants' Waiver of
the Right to Appeal-an Unacceptable Condition of a Negotiated Sentence or Plea Bar-
gain, 65 Notre Dame L Rev 649, 657 (1990) ("[Ihe practice of imposing greater sentenc-
es ... following a successful appeal [might have] a deterrent effect ... on defendants
contemplating an appeal.").
[82:17051744
Truth or Unintended Consequences
This result also runs counter to basic ideals of the criminal
justice system. Primarily, defendants are not supposed to be
punished for their success on appeal,235 but granting sentence in-
creases when the defendant is the only party who has requested
relief would do just that. Further, although it is true that de-
fendants always face this risk to some degree (when filing an
appeal there is always the possibility that the government will
simultaneously file its own appeal or cross-appeal), the fact that
a defendant not confronted with a cross-appeal could face in-
creased punishment also violates the ideal of the adversarial
system. 3 6 Greenlaw itself encourages this view, as the Court
suggested that defendants should not lose at resentencing fol-
lowing a successful appeal and found it "hard to imagine" that
resentencing courts would correct errors to benefit a nonappeal-
ing party.23 7 Any appellate court efforts that subvert these prin-
ciples are in violation of the protections that the Greenlaw Court
created.
B. The Mandate Rule
Appellate courts can avoid this possible Greenlaw violation
by narrowly confining their remands to reach only those issues
raised by the appealing party and by policing the lower courts'
adherence to these mandates. Section 2106 permits appellate
courts to issue either general or limited remands, and courts
should use this ability to define the scope of resentencing to
avoid violating the spirit of Greenlaw.
Limited remands would effectively prevent the district court
from making any upward adjustments in circumstances when
only the defendant has appealed. Remands should be limited
to permit the district court to revisit only those arguments
specifically advanced by the appealing party. This policy could
be applied in situations similar to Anderson, in which the ap-
pellate court evaluated various departures that possibly offset
each other. For example, assume that a defendant argues on
appeal that he improperly received a two-level enhancement at
235 See Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 363 (1978) ("To punish a person because
he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most
basic sort."); Pearce, 395 US at 724 ("A defendant's exercise of a right of appeal must be
free and unfettered.").
236 See Frost, 59 Duke L J at 457-58 (cited in note 44) (describing party control over
case presentation as an essential aspect of the adversarial system).
237 Greenlaw, 554 US at 254 n 8.
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sentencing and requests remand. The Government does not ap-
peal or cross-appeal. Instead, it merely argues that the sentence
should be affirmed, because the defendant also received an im-
proper three-level reduction and therefore his current sentence
was lower than it otherwise should have been. If the appellate
court concludes that the defendant did in fact receive an im-
proper increase, the court should remand the case with instruc-
tions to resentence accordingly. Even if the appellate court de-
cides that the defendant also received an improper decrease, the
remand should not permit the resentencing court to revisit this
error, because the Government did not appeal.
This is not to say that appellate courts cannot address ar-
guments presented by the government in opposition to remand.
In Rushton, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the error iden-
tified by the defendant was offset by an additional error identi-
fied by the Government.23 The court would have been well
within the confines of Greenlaw to deny the appeal on the
grounds that the error presented by Rushton was therefore
harmless. Rushton's appeal still would have cost him nothing. It
is only when the appellate court determines that an error to the
defendant's detriment was not harmless and actually requires
remand that the court must use the mandate rule to ensure that
the sentence is not increased.
If appellate courts must employ a limited remand when the
likely outcome is a sentence increase, the next question is how
likely an increase must be for this requirement to apply. In the
example above, permitting reconsideration of the improper re-
duction could lead only to an increase in sentence. The reduction
issue should therefore be excluded from the scope of the remand.
However, there may be circumstances in which the basis for re-
mand could cut in either direction, such as when the appellate
court requests greater explanation of the defendant's sentence
(as the court did in Anderson). Requiring additional explanation
may be equally likely to lead to an increase, a decrease, or no
change in sentence. But the important issue in Anderson was
not the remand itself but the appellate court's basis for finding
the error.28 9 Appellate courts typically do not remand for general
reconsiderations. In Anderson, the only error the court identified
as the basis for requiring additional explanation was that the
238 Rushton, 738 F3d at 860 (' he alternative to ordering resentencing would be to
pronounce the errors not plain because they were offsetting.").
239 Anderson, 526 F3d at 329-30.
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calculated Guidelines range was too low, an error clearly to the
defendant's advantage.240 When the only basis for the remand is
an error in the defendant's favor, remand should not be awarded
at all if the government did not appeal or cross-appeal.
A similar issue might arise if an appellate court instead
finds two errors justifying the requirement of additional expla-
nation. Suppose that the court finds--on its own-that the orig-
inally calculated Guidelines range was too low, and that the de-
fendant successfully argues that the sentencing court failed to
address the risk of unwarranted disparity among various de-
fendants. In such a case, the appellate court should limit the
remand to permit the resentencing court to consider only the
error made to the defendant's detriment. Because the Gov-
ernment has not cross-appealed, it should not get the benefit
of reconsideration.
The use of limited remands in the criminal-sentencing con-
text is not unheard of. Appellate courts have interpreted the
power to remand in the sentencing context as including the
power to order limited remands.241 Following the Court's decision
in Booker, the Ninth Circuit adopted a limited-remand approach
for reviewing sentences imposed under the previously mandato-
ry Guidelines when the defendant has not appealed his sen-
tence. 242 Under this approach, the Ninth Circuit remands to a
district court "for the sole purpose" of determining whether the
lower court would have imposed a different sentence under the
now-advisory Guidelines.243 This example demonstrates how ap-
pellate courts can use limited remands to effectively narrow the
issues addressed by district courts. Further, it demonstrates
that appellate courts have found criminal sentencing an appro-
priate area in which to employ limited remands. Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit has specifically emphasized that "providing direc-
tion to the district court on how to cure [legal error] is a quintes-
sentially appellate function.244 The use of limited remands also
240 Id at 331 n 7.
241 See, for example, United States v Ameline, 409 F3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir 2005).
242 See id at 1084. See also Michael Guasco, Note, Defining "Ordinary Prudential
Doctrines" after Booker: Why the Limited Remand Is the Least of Many Evils, 37 Golden
Gate U L Rev 609, 625 (2007) (discussing the Ninth Circuit's new "limited-remand pro-
cedure"). The Seventh Circuit and the DC Circuit have also both adopted a limited-
remand approach to these types of cases, with slight procedural differences. See United
States v Paladino, 401 F3d 471, 484 (7th Cir 2005); United States v Coles, 403 F3d 764,
770 (DC Cir 2005).
243 Guasco, Note, 37 Golden Gate U L Rev at 625 (cited in note 242).
244 Ameline, 409 F3d at 1082.
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encourages procedural efficiency. An appellate court can more
easily review a district court's resentencing to determine wheth-
er it adhered to the remand when the appellate court has nar-
rowly cabined the scope of reviewable issues.
C. Reinterpreting Greenlaw and Pepper to a Broader
Limitation
Limited remands would confine the behavior of district
courts, but this solution relies heavily on the assumption that
appellate courts will choose to use limited rather than general
remands. Further, expanded use of limited remands leaves un-
resolved the question of what courts should do when the basis
for remand is effectively neutral in that it is equally likely to
lead to a decrease or an increase. One example of a possibly neu-
tral basis for remand is demonstrated by an argument advanced
in Rushton: that a particular sentence is impermissibly general.
A defendant might request that the appellate court remand the
case so that the district court can apportion the sentence to each
charge. This remand would be neutral in that it would not in it-
self suggest that the sentence should have been either higher or
lower. If the appellate court remands the case and directs the
district court to separate the sentence by charge, the district
court might then resentence the defendant in a way that in-
creases the aggregate punishment. A limited remand would be
of no help to the defendant in this case, as the court would have
done what the defendant had asked.
Greenlaw must be read functionally not only to bar appel-
late courts from remanding when the only basis for doing so is
an error clearly in the defendant's favor but also to bar district
courts from increasing a sentence whenever remand follows a
defendant's appeal. Greenlaw clearly encourages this pro-
appellant perspective by suggesting that defendants should
lose nothing on remand following a successful appeal.245 Fur-
ther, Pepper must be limited to permit de novo consideration of
sentencing errors only when the reevaluation would benefit
the appealing party. If an appellate court has vacated a de-
fendant's sentence following his successful appeal, the district
court charged with imposing a new sentence can consider only
those errors that would have made the sentence too high. Any
245 Greenlaw, 554 US at 252 ('Thus a defendant who appeals but faces no cross-
appeal can proceed anticipating that the appellate court will not enlarge his sentence.").
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deviation from the vacated sentence must be to the defendant's
advantage.
This reinterpretation of precedent is not beyond the typical
practices of courts. For example, when the Court interprets its
own ambiguous precedent-such as Greenlaw, which can be de-
scribed as ambiguous since the decision fails to fully explain how
it interacts with precedent-the Court can "bend[] its interpre-
tations toward first principles" in a way similar to its practice of
constitutional avoidance.246 Courts have done just that in declin-
ing to interpret cases in ways that would conflict with prior
precedent.247 To do otherwise under these circumstances would
effect precisely what courts strive to prevent: punishment of de-
fendants for their success.
D. Considering Role Reversal
The cases addressed in this Comment all present instances
of appellate courts attempting to correct errors that originally
benefitted the defendant. This Comment establishes that de-
fendants should not be subjected to punishment exceeding that
which the government requests. But it may be that the prohibi-
tion against correcting unappealed sentencing errors would pre-
vent appellate courts from aiding a defendant as often as it
would prevent the courts from punishing him further. Consider
a situation in which a defendant is sentenced and only the Gov-
ernment appeals; the court rejects the Government's argument
and finds that an error improperly increased the defendant's
sentence. Should the appellate court be similarly prevented from
remanding for correction of this error-a correction that would
likely reduce the defendant's sentence? Such a result would be
troublesome, and a more expansive reading of Greenlaw sug-
gests that appellate courts should not be so limited.
The Greenlaw Court relied on the cross-appeal rule, which is
a broad doctrine that theoretically provides no greater protec-
tion for defendants than it does for the government in achieving
accurate sentencing. However, the Court's ultimate holding spe-
cifically states that sentences cannot be increased absent an
246 Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 Colum L Rev
1861, 1865 (2014) (discussing this means of interpretation in the context of narrowing
previous precedent).
247 See, for example, United States v Goldberg, 295 F3d 1133, 1140 (10th Cir 2002)
("To avoid conflict with precedent predating Jones, we choose not to read that case in
this manner.").
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appeal or cross-appeal by the government.248 The Court ex-
plained that "[e]ven if there might be circumstances in which it
would be proper for an appellate court to initiate plain-error re-
view, sentencing errors that the Government refrained from
pursuing would not fit the bill."249 The logic may be that impos-
ing too high a prison term in the face of any error-whether ap-
pealed by the defendant or not-is a violation of an individual
right, whereas the government has no corresponding "right" to
accurate sentencing. A plain error to the defendant's detriment,
otherwise forfeited, is therefore likely to affect substantial rights
in a way that a plain error to the government's detriment will
not. This conclusion does not counsel in favor of disparate appli-
cations of the waiver and forfeiture doctrines for defendants ver-
sus the government at resentencing. Rather, it indicates that
there may be reasons to permit sua sponte appellate review in
order to prevent the threat to substantial rights that is created
by excessive imprisonment.
CONCLUSION
Ever since the Supreme Court decided Greenlaw, appellate
courts have refrained from expressly imposing higher sentences
absent government appeals. However, appellate courts have
used other means to create the same result, going against the
spirit of the Court's assertion that a successful appellant should
not receive a harsher punishment as a result of his own appeal.
The Court has provided little guidance as to how this general
maxim interacts with district courts' authority to increase sen-
tences at resentencing, leaving courts conflicted as to whether
the scope of resentencing is limited to the issues presented on
appeal.
Appellate courts can remedy this confusion by issuing strict
remand orders that clearly confine the scope of review and pre-
vent district courts from revisiting errors that were not raised
on appeal. Using limited remands will ensure that defendants
have adequate notice of both the possible outcomes on appeal
and the possible issues at resentencing. It will enable defend-
ants to make informed decisions about whether moving forward
with an appeal is worth the risk that the government will file its
own cross-appeal, without having to predict what the appellate
248 Greenlaw, 554 US at 240.
249 Id at 248.
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or district court might choose to consider sua sponte. By issuing
limited remands, appellate courts will also ensure that resen-
tencing decisions can be more easily reviewed to determine
whether district courts exceeded the authority granted on re-
mand. This appellate response properly adheres to the function-
al ban established in Greenlaw without creating unnecessary
conflict with the Court's prior precedent. Most importantly, it
protects unsuspecting defendants from the infliction of harsher
punishments that no one asks for.

